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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
            
  
 
                          
* Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig, United States District Judge for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
  
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 Oliva was convicted of embezzling union funds in 
violation of 29 U.S.C. § 501(c).  His appeal presents us with 
four issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict 
him; (2) whether reimbursement is a defense to embezzlement; (3) 
whether the statute of limitation bars his indictment and 
conviction; and (4) whether the district court committed 
reversible error in its instructions to the jury on the "intent" 
element of the offense.  We will affirm.  The first two issues 
are wholly without merit and require no explanation.  The latter 
two, however, we explain as follows. 
 I. 
 Oliva was the manager of the South Jersey Joint Board 
of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union, having 
"inherited" the position from his father.  The Joint Board was 
composed of six members, including Oliva, a business agent, and 
two clerical employees.  While he was Joint Board manager, Oliva 
regularly submitted substantial travel expenses that he claimed 
were incurred on behalf of the union.  Among these expenses were 
three airline tickets, issued in the names of his wife and two 
children, for round-trip travel between Philadelphia and Miami.  
The tickets were purchased with the Joint Board's American 
Express card, which had been given to Oliva for union-related 
expenses.  The tickets were paid for on February 1, 1987, when 
the union's office secretary prepared a Joint Board check as 
  
payment for its January 1987 American Express bill, obtained 
Oliva's signature on the check, and mailed the check to American 
Express.  The check cleared on February 5, 1987. 
 The facts were largely undisputed and the primary issue 
for the jury was whether these tickets were obtained with 
fraudulent intent, as the Government contended, or whether 
Oliva's wife's ticket had been authorized by the Joint Board and 
the children's tickets had been paid for with Joint Board funds 
in error, as Oliva claimed. 
 Oliva introduced Joint Board minutes purportedly 
authorizing his wife to accompany him on union-related trips.  He 
also introduced the testimony of a retired Joint Board officer to 
support his claim.  He acknowledged that the children's tickets 
were not authorized, but argued that they were purchased with the 
union credit card solely to get a better rate.  He claimed that 
there was no difference between reimbursing the union for these 
tickets after the trip rather than before.  Defense counsel 
acknowledged in his opening and closing statements, that while 
Oliva may have spent union money "imprudently," he had always 
done so with the good faith belief that he was helping the Joint 
Board's constituents by trying to get work for them from textile 
manufacturers. 
 Other Joint Board members testified that the Board had 
not authorized payment for Oliva's wife to travel with him and 
that all Board members were required to pay travel expenses for 
  
their spouses.  These Board members also testified that a number 
of sets of Joint Board minutes, including those concerning 
authorization for Oliva's salary, Christmas bonus, and travel for 
Oliva and his wife, contained "downright lies" and did not 
accurately reflect what happened at Joint Board meetings.  The 
Board members and the office secretary who typed the minutes also 
testified that Oliva prepared the minutes and they contained 
whatever he wanted. 
 The government introduced evidence concerning Oliva's 
use of Joint Board funds for personal expenditures.  One such 
expenditure, totaling $7,000, was incurred when Oliva arrived on 
the last day of a 1986 AFL-CIO convention in Florida  
(a convention he was to attend but not participate in) and 
remained in Florida for approximately two more weeks.  During 
this time, Oliva spent $800 of the union's money on two tickets 
for a racing event.  Other expenses for which Oliva was 
reimbursed included limousine service, airfare, hotels and meals 
relating to two trips he and his wife took to a gun manufacturer 
in Yakima, Washington.  This trip was exclusively for the benefit 
of Oliva's gun dealership, which he operated from the Joint 
Board's offices while serving as its manager. 
 The evidence at trial showed that these appropriations 
had a false union authorization.  The Yakima-related expenses 
were approved without question by Joint board Secretary 
Patitucci, who was ostensibly acting on behalf of the Joint 
  
Board's "finance committee."  In addition, Joint Board minutes 
purportedly authorized the Yakima trips.  These minutes stated 
that during the trips Oliva met with his peers on ACTWU's Pacific 
Northwest Joint Board and with a textile manufacturer in that 
region.  A Pacific Northwest Joint Board officer testified at 
trial that both claims were entirely false. 
 The evidence also included numerous charges to the 
Joint Board's Federal Express account that were really incurred 
on behalf of Oliva's gun business.  An office secretary testified 
not only to the personal nature of these expenses, but also that 
several times she expressed a concern about paying these charges 
with union funds, but was told by Oliva to pay them anyway. 
 When the ACTWU auditors spotted Oliva's purchase of 
airline tickets to Florida for his children, they questioned 
Oliva as to its legitimacy.  It was only after this inquiry that 
Oliva reimbursed the Joint Board for the two airline tickets. 
 II. 
 The first issue we address is whether a belief that 
one's acts were unauthorized and/or were not for the benefit of 
the union are merely factors bearing on intent or whether they 
are the essence of intent and must be proven at trial.  Courts of 
appeals have taken essentially three different approaches.  The 
first approach is that a conviction under § 501(c) can be 
obtained under an "unauthorized expenditure" theory if the 
government proves that the defendant had a fraudulent intent to 
  
deprive the union of its funds and that he lacked a good faith 
belief that the expenditure was for the legitimate "benefit of 
the union."  United States v. Gibson, 675 F.2d 825, 828-29 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972 (1982). 
 In the second approach, courts have placed a greater 
weight on union authorization.  The First Circuit Court of 
Appeals' view is reflected in United States v. Sullivan, 498 F.2d 
146, 150 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974) ("In our 
view the willing acceptance of misappropriated union funds by a 
recipient who knows that such funds are unauthorized and illegal 
will constitute a violation of § 501(c)").  The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has taken the same position in United States v. 
Stockton, 788 F.2d 210, 217 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
840 (1986) ("[T]he traditional concept of embezzlement comprises 
(1) a conversion -- or, in other words, an unauthorized 
appropriation -- of property belonging to another, where (2) the 
property is lawfully in the defendant's possession (though for a 
limited purpose) at the time of the appropriation, and (3) the 
defendant acts with knowledge that his appropriation of the 
property is unauthorized, or at least without a good-faith belief 
that it has been authorized."). 
 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals focuses at times on 
benefit, while at other times it highlights authorization.  
Compare United States v. Lavergne, 805 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(in cases of misuse of authorized funds the government must rebut 
  
a defendant's good faith defense that his actions benefitted the 
union); with United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1232 (5th Cir. 
1976) (once lack of authorization is shown, the prosecution need 
not show lack of union benefit).  In one other case the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit appears to have abandoned the 
foregoing formula entirely.  United States v. Durnin, 632 F.2d 
1297, 1300 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1980) (where government thoroughly 
establishes fraudulent intent it is not necessary to determine 
whether act was authorized). 
 Then finally, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals seems 
to place equal weight on both union authorization and benefit.  
In United States v. Butler, 954 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1992), the 
court held that "a union official charged with embezzling union 
funds pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §501(c) lacks the requisite criminal 
intent when the evidence establishes that he had a good-faith 
belief both that the funds were expended for the union's benefit 
and that the expenditures were authorized (or would be ratified) 
by the union."   
 There are obvious problems with these two approaches, 
which do not adequately protect union members and their funds.  
First, the owners of the fund (union members) are never in a 
position to authorize the use of the funds.  Moreover, the 
owner's delegates, the union leaders who authorize the trips, are 
often the ones who take them.  Hence, there is a potential for 
abusing the authorization.  With respect to the benefit theory, 
  
those who take the trips may often be in the strongest position 
to justify them as a benefit to the union in ways that are not 
easily disproven.  The law, however, is designed to protect the 
funds of the members.   
 We believe the better approach, and one which avoids 
the paradoxes of the "benefits" and "authorization" defenses, is 
the totality of circumstances test used by the Seventh, Eighth 
and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals.  See United States v. Floyd, 
882 F.2d 235, 240 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Welch, 728 
F.2d 1113, 1119-20 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Thordarson, 
646 F.2d 1323, 1334, 1336 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 
(1981).  This requires that the factfinder look at all evidence 
in light of all circumstances to determine whether the government 
has proven the requisite intent.  Within this analysis, both 
authorization and benefit are merely factors that may be 
considered as bearing on intent.     
 Applying the totality of circumstances test, we 
conclude that the district court properly instructed the jury.  
First, the district court read to the jury both § 501(c) and the 
definition of a fiduciary, which is contained in § 501(a).  The 
district court then enumerated the four elements of a § 501(c) 
offense, including as the fourth element "that the defendant 
acted knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully, and with fraudulent intent 
to deprive the South Jersey Joint Board of its money, funds, 
securities, property or other assets."  The district court 
  
instructed the jury that Oliva's acts must have been "knowing," 
"wilful," and "unlawful," then defined those terms for the jury.  
It told the jury that in  
 
 determining the issues of knowledge and 
fraudulent intent, you may consider any 
statement made and acts done or not done by 
the defendant, J. Michael Oliva, as well as 
all of the facts and circumstances in 
evidence which surround or attend the 
defendant's actions or statements, or which 
may aid you in determining the defendant's 
state of mind. 
 The district court also advised the jury members that 
it was for them to determine whether Oliva's purchase of the 
airline tickets was authorized and whether Oliva knew if they 
were authorized.  This, the court instructed the jury, should 
also be considered in deciding whether Oliva had fraudulent 
intent.  Next, the district court advised the jury that, in 
determining whether or not he possessed the requisite fraudulent 
intent, "it is for you to consider whether or not he lacked the 
good faith belief that [the tickets] benefitted the union as a 
whole . . ." or "the union members . . . as a whole."  The court 
further advised the jury that their determination must be made 
"from all the surrounding circumstances that he lacked the good 
faith belief of benefit to the members of the union as a whole." 
 We conclude that, although the district court did not 
have the benefit of which among the various options on intent 
this court would adopt, it instructed the jury properly.   
 III. 
  
 The general five-year statute of limitations applies to 
noncapital criminal offenses, including violations of 29 U.S.C.  
§ 501(c).  Accordingly, to avoid being considered time-barred, an 
indictment must be "found" within five years after the offense 
has been "committed."  18 U.S.C. § 3282.  An indictment is found 
when it is returned by a grand jury and filed.  United States v. 
Srulowitz, 819 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 
(1987).  Where, as here, the government has filed a superseding 
indictment, the day on which the original indictment was filed 
controls for statute of limitation purposes, provided that, as 
here, the superseding indictment does not materially broaden or 
substantially amend the charges in the first.  United States v. 
Friedman, 649 F.2d 199, 203-04 (3d Cir. 1981) (adopting United 
States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 601-02 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
 The determination of when the crime has been committed 
for statute of limitation purposes, however, is ordinarily a 
question of fact for the jury.  See United States v. Walsh, 928 
F.2d 7, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1991).  The issue on appeal is ordinarily 
whether a jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the offense had been committed within the requisite period.  
Id. 
 Nonetheless, here we cannot review the statute of 
limitations issue because it has been waived.  We have held that 
the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which is 
waived if not first raised in the district court.  United States 
  
v. Karlin, 785 F.2d 90, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 
U.S. 907 (1987).  In Karlin the defendant was convicted of 
failing to file income tax returns.  Among the issues on appeal 
was whether one tax year fell outside the applicable six-year 
statute of limitations.  The count at issue in the indictment had 
been filed after the statute of limitations had run.  Karlin, 
however, had not made this argument in the district court, but 
raised it for the first time on appeal.  We held that "in 
criminal cases the statute of limitations does not go to the 
jurisdiction of the court but is an affirmative defense that will 
be considered waived if not raised in the district court before 
or at trial."  Id. at 92-93. 
 It is undisputed that Oliva neither raised the statute 
of limitations as a defense before or at trial nor asked for any 
jury instructions on the defense.  Hence, Oliva's failure amounts 
to a waiver which prevents us from reaching the issue on direct 
appeal.  See United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 950-51 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986).  Claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel should ordinarily be raised in a collateral 
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  See United States v. Sandini, 
888 F.2d 300, 312 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1089 
(1990).  Hence, although appellant's counsel invites us to decide 
the statute of limitations issue, we will not.  Moreover, we 
cannot, for the simple reason that the record is not fully 
developed on whether the failure to raise the statute of 
  
limitation at the appropriate time would have been successful 
and, hence, that the failure to do so rendered counsel's 
assistance ineffective. 
 IV. 
 In sum, we conclude that the district court properly 
instructed the jury and that Oliva has waived the statute of 
limitations issue.  We will therefore affirm the judgment of 
conviction. 
